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The Regulatory Record of the Greenspan Fed
By CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS*
Alan Greenspan played an important role in
shaping major changes in the structure and rules
of financial regulation. Indeed, it is in this realm
that Chairman Greenspan has made his most im-
portant contributions as an institutional innovator.
Just describing how the Federal Reserve
made possible the expansion of commercial
banks’ powers to permit them to engage in
investment banking could occupy this entire
essay. That change occurred in several stages,
beginning with the Fed’s decision in 1987 to
allow small inroads by banks into investment
banking. Those changes created a favorable
track record, which laid the groundwork for the
Administration’s and Congress’s willingness to
eliminate restrictions entirely in 1999 (a policy
the Fed advocated in the 1990s). The growth in
commercial banks’ market share in investment
banking has been dramatic. In 1992, only 10
percent of corporate debt and less than 1 percent
of corporate equity flotations were underwritten
solely or jointly by commercial banks. By 2002,
that share had grown to 66 percent of debt and
36 percent of equity (Calomiris and Thanavut
Pornrojnangkool, 2006).
Can one identify a “philosophy of regulation”
that underlies the regulatory advocacy of the
Fed under Chairman Greenspan? Although the
Fed’s advocacy on various matters may appear
somewhat contradictory or, at least, philosoph-
ically heterodox, the Fed has behaved in a man-
ner that is remarkably predictable, once one
takes account of the political arena in which
both regulatory and monetary policy are made.
There is fairly straightforward logic to the
Fed’s regulatory advocacy. To understand it,
one must consider the Fed as a political player
in the Washington drama; as a creature of Con-
gress subject to its oversight; as a competitor
with other regulators for influence within the
financial services industry and within the polit-
ical realm; and as a prioritizing agent that had to
decide which battles (monetary or regulatory) to
fight—when, and how hard.
One lesson of this overview of Fed regulatory
advocacy during the Greenspan years is that the
algorithm of Fed advocacy (the decision proc-
ess that decides which position the Fed will
advocate) has not changed, although some of
the specific policy advocacy has. John Hawke
(1988) wrote an evaluation of Chairman Paul
Volcker’s regulatory policy during his years at
the Fed, which was presented at the 1988 ASSA
Annual Meeting, and which describes an ap-
proach to Fed policy that is similar to the one
suggested here. In that sense, Chairman Green-
span did not change the Fed; indeed, it is prob-
ably more accurate to say that his personal
advocacy was changed by being at the Fed. But
that does not imply an irrelevance to his lead-
ership. What emerges from a review of Green-
span’s regulatory record is an appreciation of
his skill as a Beltway warrior, particularly with
respect to his success in facilitating the geograph-
ical expansion of banks, broadening bank powers,
and securing a prominent role for the Fed under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
I. The Fed’s Regulatory Advocacy Algorithm:
Ten Examples
In Table 1, I list ten of the main regulatory
issues with which the Greenspan Fed has grap-
pled. I categorize financial regulatory issues
into four categories, according to my interpre-
tation of the Fed’s actions and the dominant
motives for those actions. The first category is
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labeled “Fed advocacy of beneficial deregula-
tion.” The remaining three categories include
cases where the Fed has opposed beneficial
regulatory policies, which I attribute to three
reasons: “too politically hot to handle,” “not in
the interest of the big banks,” or a “Fed regu-
latory power play” to boost its own political
influence.
My proposed regulatory advocacy algorithm
for the Fed is fairly simple. The Fed supports
beneficial deregulation so long as doing so does
not (a) stir up significant political opposition to
the Fed within Congress or the Administration,
which might threaten its monetary policy inde-
pendence, (b) harm the large commercial banks
(which are key allies of the Fed in its political
battles in Washington), or (c) undermine the
Fed’s competitive position vis-a`-vis other regu-
lators. Furthermore, these three constraints (op-
position by politicians, opposition by big banks,
TABLE 1—EXAMPLES OF FED REGULATORY ADVOCACY
Fed Advocacy of Beneficial Regulation
Interstate branching The Greenspan Fed has been a much more vocal advocate of interstate
branching than the Volcker Fed, owing to changes in the political
landscape that allowed the Fed to support branching with little political
risk, and with strong support from large banks.
Mergers and acquisitions The Fed has supported large bank mergers. Although this has largely been
beneficial, the merger of Fleet Bank and BankBoston Corp. shows that
the Fed may be too willing to permit undesirable concentration of
power to occur.
Fannie and Freddie post 2000 Once the political climate had become less risky, in cooperation with
reform leadership by Congressman Richard Baker and the White House,
the Greenspan Fed became a vocal proponent of reform, with strong
support from large banks.
Investment banking powers The Fed led the efforts to expand banking powers, particularly in the area
of underwriting of corporate securities. This was done gradually, and at
a time when large banks’ international competitiveness was threatened,
both of which limited the risk of a political backlash. This was strongly
supported by the large banks.
Not in the Interest of the Big Banks
Banking and commerce The Fed opposes permitting nonbank firms (e.g., WalMart) to compete
with banks, a position that supports the interests of large banks, and
also limits regulatory competition with the Fed.
Minimum subordinated debt
requirement for large banks
Despite widespread evidence supporting the view that such a requirement
would boost prudential regulatory and supervisory discipline, some of
which was produced by Fed staff, the Fed killed this initiative, due to
opposition from the large banks.
Too Politically Hot to Handle
Fannie and Freddie pre 2000 Fed officials and researchers were silent during the early phase of the
reform efforts involving these Government Sponsored Enterprises
because of the perceived political risks.
Community Reinvestment Act Not an effective or efficient policy, yet the Fed does not oppose it because
of the perceived political risks of doing so.
Real estate brokerage Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the Fed shares with the Treasury Department
authority to decide which activities qualify as permissible “financial”
activities for financial holding companies. This places the Fed in a
difficult position when there is strong political opposition to permitting
entry. Despite the absence of any economic argument against permitting
banks to act as real estate brokers, the Fed seeks to avoid the political
fallout from supporting the effort.
Fed Regulatory Power Play
Investment banking subsidiaries versus
affiliates
The Fed sought to limit the ability of banks to operate securities
subsidiaries and other subsidiaries of banks, as opposed to affiliates, in
a largely unsuccessful power play against the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency.
Umbrella financial supervision by the
Fed
The Fed succeeded in having itself appointed as an umbrella supervisor of
financial holding companies under Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
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and erosion of Fed regulatory power) may lead
the Fed not only to fail to support beneficial
deregulation but also to actively support harm-
ful regulation, or in the case of antitrust regu-
lation, fail to enforce beneficial regulation (i.e.,
against undesirable anticompetitive mergers).
Underlying this categorization are two sets of
substantive claims on my part: first, claims
about what constitutes beneficial regulation, and
second, claims about the interests that are
served by supporting or opposing regulation. In
the longer version of this paper (available from
the author on request), I review in detail both
sets of claims for the ten regulatory examples in
Table 1 (interstate branching; mergers and ac-
quisitions; Fannie and Freddie; investment
banking powers; permitting investment banking
subsidiaries versus affiliates; umbrella supervi-
sion by the Fed; banking and commerce; requir-
ing large banks to issue subordinated debt; the
Community Reinvestment Act; and real estate
brokerage).
Two other aspects of Chairman Greenspan’s
record as a regulatory advocate warrant men-
tion. First, he was a first-rate rhetorician. One of
Chairman Greenspan’s great skills was to shift
the burden of proof to suit his argument. When
he advocated deregulation (as in the case of
expanding underwriting powers via affiliates),
he argued that there was no clear evidence that
deregulation would cause harm. When he op-
posed deregulation, he argued that there was no
clear evidence that deregulation would not
cause harm. In the case of permitting underwrit-
ing, he used gradualism to compromise with
worrisome critics, and build a record of perfor-
mance on which to base further relaxation of
constraints. But he did not advocate gradualism
and experimentation as a means to overcome
uncertainties on the part of policymakers in
other areas (notably with respect to permitting
underwriting in subsidiaries, or with respect to
allowing commercial firms to provide financial
services). Chairman Greenspan knew how to
overcome congressional fears of change when he
wanted to. He also knew how to use Congress’s
fear of change as a tool to limit deregulation.
Second, the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of
1999—the Chairman’s moment of greatest tri-
umph—was a double-edged triumph. On the
one hand, Chairman Greenspan succeeded in
his advocacy in the areas of broadening bank
powers, securing umbrella supervisory author-
ity, giving the Fed an ongoing role in deciding
which activities would be permissible in finan-
cial holding companies, and limiting competi-
tion in banking from nonbanks (benefiting his
big bank allies, while also limiting competition
with the Fed in the regulation of banks). On the
other hand, the Fed’s new authority to deter-
mine permissible financial activities places it
more squarely in the middle of political disputes
that it does not really want to decide, because of
the political risks of having to do so.
II. The Case for Ending the Fed’s Role as a
Financial Regulator
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Fed’s advo-
cacy role was largely benign. Despite the fact that
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the Fed was often on the wrong side in the ten
areas reviewed in Table 1, it was on the right side
of the most important controversies; and it made a
difference in helping to win some important reg-
ulatory changes, most notably the consolidation of
the banking industry and the expansion of bank
powers into other financial areas.
In the future, the Fed is likely not to play a
helpful role in resolving the most important
regulatory issues. The most important desirable
changes of the next decade will involve permit-
ting the entry of nonbanks into banking, and
developing stronger regulatory oversight to
limit excessive concentration within the finan-
cial sector (not just for banks, but for ratings
agencies, accounting firms, and other financial
intermediaries). The Fed’s political objectives
and its alliance with large banks will limit its
future effectiveness. Looking forward, there is
an increasing benefit derived from removing
regulatory authority from the Fed (a change that
would align U.S. regulatory practice with the
rest of the financially developed world, as
shown in Table 2). Although removing regulatory
powers from the Fed has little political support
today, Chairman Greenspan’s departure may fa-
cilitate the renewed discussion of the need to
separate monetary policy from regulatory policy,
now that the Fed will be deprived of his personal
stature, which has been used as a powerful
weapon to defeat opponents of the Fed’s agenda,
and sometimes to prevent beneficial reform.
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